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A B S T R A C T
Community initiatives aiming to reduce health inequalities are increasingly common in health policy. Though
diverse many such initiatives aim to support residents of disadvantaged places to exercise greater collective
control over decisions/actions that affect their lives - which research suggests is an important determinant of
health – and some seek to achieve this by giving residents control over a budget. Informed by theoretical work in
which community capabilities for collective control are conceptualised as different forms of power, and applying
a relational lens, this paper presents findings on the potential role of money as a mechanism to enhance these
capabilities from an on-going evaluation of a major place-based initiative being implemented in 150 neigh-
bourhoods across England:The Big Local (BL). The research involved semi-structured interviews with 116 di-
verse stakeholders, including residents and participant observation in a diverse sample of 10 BL areas. We took a
thematic constant comparative approach to the analysis of data from across the sites. The findings suggest that
the money enabled the development of capabilities for collective control in these communities primarily by
enhancing connectivity amongst residents and with external stakeholders. However, residents had to engage in
significant ‘relational work’ to achieve these benefits and tensions around the money could hinder communities'
‘power to act’. Greater social connectivity has been shown to directly affect individual and population health by
increasing social cohesion and reducing loneliness. Additionally, supporting enhanced collective control of re-
sidents in these disadvantaged communities has the potential to improve population health and reduce health
inequalities.
1. Introduction
Community empowerment as a route to greater health equity is
enshrined in foundational health promotion/public health statements
(WHO, 1997; WHO, 1986). Definitions vary but we define community
empowerment as processes through which communities of interest or
place develop the capabilities they need to exercise greater collective
control over decisions and actions impacting on their lives and health.
Initiatives aiming to enhance individual or community empowerment
are supported by a growing body of research demonstrating that
‘control over one's destiny’ (Syme, 1989) is a fundamental determinant
of health, and lack of control could be a significant cause of health
inequalities. Community empowerment is thus now integral to the
Global Sustainable Development Goals and many local, national and
international strategies for social and health development (e.g. WHO
EURO, 2013; 2019; UN Economic and Social Council, 2019).
Local place-based initiatives designed to be ‘empowering’ are di-
verse but some seek to enhance collective control over decisions and
actions by giving community members control over a budget. Informed
by theoretical work in which community capabilities for collective
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control are conceptualised as different forms of power - ‘power within';
‘power with’ and 'power to' – this paper considers the role of money as a
mechanism to enhance these capabilities presenting findings from an
on-going evaluation of a major place-based initiative being im-
plemented in 150 neighbourhoods across England.
The paper starts with a brief overview of research on the relation-
ship between collective control and health and on the role of money in
community-based initiatives. It then describes the Big Local (BL) in-
itiative and the evaluation design and theoretical frameworks shaping
the analysis. The findings are then presented followed by a concluding
discussion.
1.1. Collective control as a determinant of health and wellbeing
Evidence is accumulating that collective control by communities
over decisions and actions impacting on their lives may be a funda-
mental determinant of population health. Different pathways linking
inequities in ‘control’ to inequities in health have been proposed
(Whitehead et al., 2016). At a community level, for example, living in
disadvantaged neighbourhoods can produce a heightened sense of
collective threat and powerlessness amongst residents; these, acting as
chronic stressors, can lead to distress, manifested as anxiety, anger or
depression – recognised as damaging to mental and physical health
(Ross, 2011). Obversely, the exercise of collective control could reduce
the health impact of disadvantage if, for example, community action
successfully prevents the siting of a toxic waste facility or attracted
resources that make the environment safer (De Vos et al., 2009; Popay
et al., 2007; Popay, 2010). Additionally, experiential knowledge ac-
quired by people living in difficult social and material conditions can
help develop more acceptable, and therefore more effective, ways to
address the risks to health they face (Wallerstein, 1992, 2002; Popay
and Williams, 1996; Pickin et al., 2002; Morgan and Popay, 2007;
Popay, 2010; Whitehead et al., 2016). Positive health effects from
collective action may also arise indirectly if participation fosters a
greater sense of connectedness, increased social support and reduced
alienation within communities, which could lead to improved mental
and physical health (Bernard et al., 2007; Popay, 2010; Oakley et al.,
1996; Reblin and Uchino, 2008). Individuals who participate in col-
lective action may also benefit from an improved sense of self-efficacy,
which research has linked to better health (Whitehead et al., 2014;
Zimmerman and Rappaport, 1988). Finally, involvement in collective
action may lead to increased political understanding and engagement.
This could potentially contribute to democratic renewal and increase
public pressure on politicians to deliver more socially just, equitable
policies that could in turn address the social determinants of health
inequities.
Research testing these pathways has produced a considerable vo-
lume of high-quality empirical evidence demonstrating that the level of
control individuals have over personal life circumstances is a significant
determinant of their health outcomes (Bosma et al., 1997; Marmot
et al., 1997; Marmot, 2005; Orton et al., 2019; Woodall et al., 2010).
Though more limited, empirical evidence is also accumulating on the
impact of enhanced control at the ‘collective’ or community level. Stu-
dies consistently report stronger evidence of impacts on intermediate
social determinants of health and health equity than direct impacts on
health (Laverack, 2006; Popay et al., 2007; Popay, 2010; Wallerstein,
2002, 2006; Whitehead et al., 2014, 2016). In their review, for ex-
ample, Woodall et al. (2010) found evidence of impacts on social co-
hesion and trust, but little evidence of direct impacts on health and
well-being outcomes at a community level. The review by Whitehead
et al. (2014) identified limited but relatively strong observational and
ecological evidence linking increased collective control over decisions
to better health. Orton et al. (2016) also found limited but good quality
RCT evidence on direct health benefits arising from micro-finance in-
terventions that increased collective control amongst women in South
Africa, Peru and Bangladesh.
The research briefly reviewed above supports the argument that
enabling disadvantaged communities to gain greater collective control
over decisions/actions impacting on their lives could contribute to re-
ducing health inequities. However, there is limited understanding of
how to design initiatives to successfully support the development of
these capabilities. In this context many different ‘experiments’ are being
implemented including initiatives in which money is a key element of
the ‘theory of change’. These initiatives have primarily been im-
plemented at the individual level as conditional cash transfers (e.g.
paying people to ensure children attend clinics and schools or as an
incentive to stop smoking) but they can also be found in community
and urban development initiatives (Rawlings et al., 2004; Reynolds
et al., 2015). For example, participatory budgeting in the English area
regeneration programme New Deal for Communities, provided opportu-
nities for 39 disadvantaged communities to have a direct say on how
significant amounts of public money were spent (Batty et al., 2010).
Initiatives that go further and aim to give communities full collec-
tive control over how money is spent to improve their neighbourhoods
are rare, but a few are emerging. Notable in the UK are the Local
Conversations programme delivered by the Peoples Health Trust and the
Lottery funded Big Local (BL) programme. Through a health equity lens
these latter developments pose an important question: in what ways
and through what pathways could the transfer of control over how
money is spent in disadvantaged communities ‘work’ to enhance their
collective control over decisions and actions that have potential to
positively impact on their lives and their health? This paper addresses
this question by exploring the role of money in the BL community
empowerment initiative in England.
1.2. Theoretical frameworks
Two theoretical frameworks have informed the findings reported in
this paper. The first, concerns the conceptualisation of the capabilities
communities need to exercise collective control. This framework was
set out in detail in a paper from the early stages of our longitudinal
evaluation (Popay et al., 2020) and then applied to qualitative data to
explore the power dynamics operating in BL areas ( Ponsford et al.,
2020; Powell et al., 2020) This Emancipatory Power Framework (EPF)
utilises the concepts of ‘Power Within’, ‘Power With’ and ‘Power To’,
which have their roots in feminist theory (Allen, 1998, 2011; Arendt,
1970; Rowlands, 1997; Starhawk, 1987). In our framework, the three
concepts of power have been adapted from the individual level to the
collective. Here, ‘Power Within’ refers to collective capabilities internal
to a community. ‘Power With’, refers to the power that emerges when a
community acts with other agencies and/or communities in the pursuit
of shared ends. ‘Power To’ refers to the exercise of collective control
capabilities to achieve desired ends.
Secondly, we drew on Somers' work on 'relational settings' and
'public narratives' (1994) and on Zelizer's concept of 'relational work' -
the efforts people make in interpersonal relationships -(2012, p149), to
examine the settings and relationships involved in the development of
capabilities for collective control in BL communities. Somers (1994,
p626) defines a relational setting as "a pattern of relationships among
institutions, public narratives, and social practices. As such it is a re-
lational matrix, a social network". While ‘public narratives’ are “those
narratives attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than
the single individual … [they] range from the narratives of one's family,
to those of the workplace (organizational myths), church, government,
and nation” (1994, p619).
This relational lens sharpened our focus on how the BL money
triggered relationships in particular settings amongst residents and
between residents and external institutions, how these relationships
were negotiated, and the meaning the money held in these relationships
(including the influence of dominant public narratives/stories about
previous experience of place-based interventions). Zelizer's (2012),
concept of ‘relational work’helped to illuminate how BL residents
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sought to ‘earmark’ money, and to identify legitimate ways to use it, as
they negotiated existing and new social relations.
2. Intervention & study design
2.1. The Big Local initiative
Big Local (BL) is a place-based programme in England, launched in
2012 for at least 10 years and funded by the National Lottery
Community Fund. Overseen by a national not-for-profit organisation -
Local Trust - the programme awarded 150 relatively disadvantaged
neighbourhoods just over £1 million each, for residents to decide how
to use the money to make their area “an even better place to live” (Local
Trust, 2018). The BL areas were selected on the basis that they had
historically ‘missed out’ on Lottery funding. They have considerable
flexibility in the design and delivery of local programmes but they are
all required to form a resident-led BL Partnership (initially some areas
established a pre-partnership steering group of community stake-
holders) to oversee the local programme, involve the wider community
in developing and delivering the plan; and review progress over time.
Each BL area has professional support through a BL Representative
(Rep) and had to identify a 'Locally Trusted Organisation' (LTO) to
manage the budget. Many BL Partnerships pay people to undertake
specific tasks (e.g. run engagement events and/or manage projects).
While not formally required to do so, the resident-led BL Partnerships
can (and typically do) engage with local public, private and/or third
sector agencies (e.g. National Health Service organisations and local
government) to attain their goals (Local Trust, 2018).
2.2. The Communities in Control (CiC) study
The CiC study is a multi-site, mixed-methods longitudinal evalua-
tion of BL being conducted by a collaboration of academics around
England. It comprises three phases from 2013 to 2021. It is funded by
the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) and the first two
phases were conducted within the NIHR School for Public Health
Research.
The findings reported here are based on qualitative data generated
during phase 1 between March 2014 and November 2015. This phase
aimed to: gain an in-depth understanding of early implementation of
the local programmes; identify any impacts on the communities’ cap-
abilities for collective control; and explore change processes associated
with these. Two waves of fieldwork were conducted in 10 areas across
England, selected from the 150 BL areas to reflect diversity in geo-
graphical spread and local context. Key elements of the latter were
population characteristics, urban/rural, contemporary socio-economic
conditions and historical trajectory.
The dataset across the ten field-sites included semi-structured face-
to-face interviews with 116 residents and other stakeholders (e.g. BL
Reps, workers appointed by residents, officers/elected members from
local authorities and staff of voluntary organisations). Initial interviews
explored a priori issues, such as impetus for BL activities, as well as
specific activities/incidents judged to have potential to illuminate the
development of collective control amongst residents. Subsequent in-
terviews followed up significant issues emerging during earlier field-
work. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Other data collection methods included: participatory activities
(e.g.walkabouts guided by residents); observation of Partnership
meetings and informal conversations recorded in fieldnotes and doc-
umentary sources (BL Partnership minutes, website material). A mix-
ture of verbal and written informed consent was obtained for all
fieldwork. Ethical approval was granted by Lancaster University
Research Ethics Committee (February 3 2014).
2.3. Data analysis
Interview transcripts were anonymized, entered into Nvivo 10 and
thematically coded using a common framework for ease of retrieval and
cross-referencing during more focussed analysis. Initial thematic ana-
lysis was ‘within site‘, followed by a comparative analysis across sites.
The analysis and interpretation were based on a process of review, re-
finement and group discussion within the research team, with agree-
ment being reached about a set of general propositions in relation to the
cross-site data (Yin, 2009). Analytic memos also informed the process
enabling researchers to use the full range of data (Charmaz, 2006; Birks
et al., 2008). As key themes developed, the research team formed sub-
groups to analyse and discuss particular themes in more detail.
The ‘money’ sub-group applied a power lens and a relational lens to
their analysis. Once an initial overall story about the ‘role of the money’
had been developed AT re-read all the interview transcripts, to check
the extent to which the ‘story’ was similar across all the fieldwork sites.
The research team also re-visited observational data to increase the
rigour of the 'story.
Coded quotes in the Findings: fieldwork Areas: A1-A10; research
method (‘Int’); participant role (R = resident; BLW = Worker em-
ployed by BL Partnership; BLR = Big Local Representative
LGO = Local Government Officer; PM = Big Local Partnership
Member; O = employee of other agencies; LC = Local Councillor).
3. Findings
In the 10 fieldwork sites during these early years of the intervention
the £1 million appeared to make a substantive contribution to the de-
velopment of ‘power within’ these communities and to their capabilities
to exercise 'power with' others. There were, however, situations in
which the money constrained the development of these collective
control capabilities and/or delayed residents' ‘power to act’. Across the
sites it was apparent that residents had to engage in significant rela-
tional work in order to achieve the benefits control over the money
could engender.
3.1. Money contributing to the development of ‘power within’ and 'power
with'
From an early stage the money operated as a catalyst for community
participation: “We had that money upfront and that was a hook” (A10-
int-LGO).
The chance to control £1 million nurtured the development of
power within these communities by increasing collective confidence in
the communities' power to spark change and the connections, skills and
knowledge needed to do this. Community events (e.g. festivals and dog
shows) built interest and increased knowledge about BL. Connections
were made between residents and local organisations – local autho-
rities; schools and not-for-profit/community organisations to share
ideas. The £1 million worked to “help move things along” (A2-int-BLR)
prompting a “coming together and drawing up a vision” (A10-int-BLW).
Community relationships were newly established and extended. In
some areas the local Partnership emerged out of existing groups but in
the majority the £1 million brought together a relatively ‘new’ group of
residents to work together for the first time. On all the BL Partnerships
the opportunity to have control over the money for local benefit gave
residents a focus for change, and excited them to get involved. As one
resident Partnership member, a local councilor, commented: “We just
talked to everyone … People were really energised by it, they thought:
‘Right, we've got this money, we can change this community’” (A6-int-
RPM).
In some areas decision-making processes involving control over how
the money was to be spent was extended beyond the residents on the BL
Partnership:
“We had a participatory budgeting event which captured people's
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imagination … it also gave them [residents] an opportunity to come
together and make really quite significant decisions about who got
money and who didn't. So … the ball was completely in their court”
(A10-int-BLW).
Significantly, there was widespread recognition that the £1million
had more than monetary value; as this resident Partnership member
highlighted, it fostered connections and collective identity within BL
communities:
“To me BL isn't about the money … it's not about the million pound
is it – it could be £10, whatever, it's about getting the community in-
volved and doing something together … I had a few ideas about what to
spend it on but then I realised it weren't about spending the money and
that's when my ideas started to change. And instead of voicing my ideas
as mine – it were always about the village for me” (A8-int-RPM).
From the beginning, in all the areas, local organisations in the
public and not-for-profit sectors were attracted to the opportunities the
£1million opened up. As an organizational stakeholder on the steering
group, set up in one area before the resident led BL Partnership was
established, commented:
“We got involved … as a key organisation in the community [the
million] could be really useful … and of course it fits very much with
what we want to do here … we want to connect with these people; we
want to be part of the development of this part of town and this
community”(A4-int-O).
In this context, the money operated as a mechanism for residents to
begin to connect with local agencies and increased their capability to
exercise 'Power With' these agencies as equals. As this resident
Partnership member explained when asked about the role of the money:
“It's enormously important … it gives some level of credibility to
what we're doing… you can go to people and say ‘Will you sponsor this,
will you support this?’ and they'll go ‘Yes … what's it all about?’ …
‘We've just got a million pounds worth of Lottery funding that has to be
spent in the community.’ So they can see the benefit” (A10-int-RPM).
Similarly, this paid worker described the assertive way in which
their Partnership approached discussions with other agencies: “We
want to invest some money. Who else wants to do it with us?” (A10-int-
BLW).
Over time the £1 million provided opportunities for residents to
further develop their ‘Power With’ by extending local connections with
a wider range of organisations and in new ways (e.g. A2, A4, A7, A8,
A9, A10). As the money enhanced the perceived legitimacy of BL
Partnerships, Partnership meetings could be a forum to engage pro-
fessionals, to deliver their plans. In several areas, professionals were
invited to formally present their proposals to Partnerships, e.g. a
builder for A8's infrastructure project and an environmental worker for
A9's green space project.
Through new connections BL residents also acquired new knowl-
edge and skills. As one Rep commented: "The million pounds is, it’s for
facilitating the community to come together, building their capacity
and assets, strengths, and levering in, using that strength to bring in
others” (A2-int-BLR). There were numerous examples of BL
Partnerships leveraging in matched funding from external agencies
across the areas (e.g. A1, A2, A5, A9, A10). These included local gov-
ernment providing professional support with BL Partnerships providing
cash (e.g. A1, A10) and a local college in A7, match funding training
courses.
These alliances could shift perspectives on where leadership and
control should lie: establishing new relationships and/or re-negotiating
the balance of power in existing ones. For example, as was highlighted
in observational notes, in A1, funding for a multi-use games area had
been suggested during a pre-BL consultation between the local gov-
ernment and young people. The BL Partnership supported the project,
contributing more than twice the funding that the local government
provided, effectively transferring ownership from the council to the
community via the BL Partnership. Notable, was how the decision to
make such a sizeable contribution helped the Partnership to realise that
they could do ‘big things.’ Up until then, they'd been allocating funds to
small projects and community events. This bigger venture released
them from focusing only on smaller initiatives. As the resident chair of
the BL Partnership commented: “A new play facility, a multi-games
area, places for the kids to go, a complete thing, with some money from
the local ward councillors, would be a great thing to do” (A1-int-RPM).
There were instances, however, when geographical, cultural and/or
social obstacles limited the ability of the money to catalyze new re-
lationships. In some instances physical boundaries inhibited connec-
tions, such as where a main road effectively cut a BL area in two and
some people did not identify as BL residents (e.g. A2, A10). In other
cases issues around identity operated as barriers to connectivity, when
for example, some residents did not see themselves as part of a dis-
advantaged area (e.g. A1, A10) and hence did not see the money as ‘for
them’.
3.2. Tensions over money: constraints on collective control
The growth of ‘Power Within’ and ‘Power With’ in these commu-
nities was accompanied by challenges that required residents to engage
in significant ‘relational work’ involving negotiated efforts to establish
and maintain new and changing relationships and to remove con-
straints on residents' ability to work with other agencies. These chal-
lenges were seen in most areas and were associated with various fac-
tors.
3.2.1. Debilitating public narratives: the history of ‘failed’ place-based
initiatives
Shared public narratives of an area shaped meanings around how
far communities could have control of the £1 million. In particular,
memories of previous money-based initiatives (e.g. A2, A4, A8) and
pre-established alliances (e.g. A7, A9) influenced perceptions of BL and
could provoke cynicism As one resident noted: “There's money that
comes and goes with all these other initiatives that have come and gone
over the years” (A2-int-RPM). The BL Rep for A4 similarly reflected on
how past failures manifested as current challenges when attempting to
forge new relationships between residents, and with outside agencies,
which in turn influenced the level of enthusiasm and ultimately the
pace of progress:
“It's a lot of trying to build the trust locally … having failed so many
times in the past and there is a lot of apathy of ‘Oh we've heard it all
before … and all the money disappeared.’ So it's getting over that” (A4-
int-BLR).
3.2.2. Money distracting from 'genuine' community action
“It's a distraction” (A6-int-O). Participants from several areas felt
that the £1million risked distracting residents' from the collective
pursuit of common goals. Some paid workers discussed how framing
the BL initiative as having £1 million to spend, undermined a com-
munity ethos: “Telling people [about] the £1 million … I'm not sure
that's a good strategy personally because it's always this thing about
money” (A8-int-BLW). Similarly, this BL Rep expresses how, for some
stakeholders, the emphasis on the money had led to a relative lack of
focus on forming, developing and supporting effective community
networks. “A few people are saying to me money is almost a distraction
… the million almost needs to be put aside for a bit … we need to look
at the community first’” (A4-int-BLR). A view shared by this non-re-
sident local government officer:
“Although the money has brought them [community members] to-
gether it doesn't necessarily mean it's the right conduit to drive them
[residents] forward together because, from my perspective, people have
a different interest if there's money on the table … Sometimes that
money is a driver when a group's not quite ready for it. It can sometimes
take over what would naturally develop or expand within a group …”
(A9-int-LGO).
Though concerns about the potential distraction of the money was
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more likely to be expressed by non-residents, some residents who had
been working to improve their neighbourhood prior to the arrival of BL
felt that the £1 million had undermined collective action: “the
Partnership … It's not organic. It's artificial … The million pounds is …
a red herring …. preventing you doing what you can do” (A8-int-RPM).
This resident, described effective, small scale community improvements
pre-BL that were undertaken with very limited funding by skilled and
experienced residents. Another resident in A3 contrasted BL with the
community's recent participation in the production of their
Neighbourhood Plan noting work already done, which could continue
without the £1 million.
3.2.3. Tensions over how the money should be used
Differing geographies and diverging understandings about legit-
imate uses for the money could provoke disagreements and risk frag-
menting social relationships amongst residents and with external
agencies. In some BL areas (e.g. A2, A10) tensions arose when different
sub-areas identified competing priorities. In one case, confusion about
the boundary of the BL area, which had been extended from one
housing estate to include a number of more affluent streets, caused
disagreements about who had legitimate claims on the £1 million (A6).
In other areas, some participants suggested that BL Partnership mem-
bers were driven by personal interests or pet projects and questioned
particular claims on the money:
“There was always that tension … money to be used for … activities
that were already started off, like the gardening club, the luncheon
club. And they just saw it as a pot of money they might be able to draw
on …” (A6-int-RLC).
There were also different opinions in some areas about the legiti-
macy of investing money in and/or working with local businesses
though many residents recognised that economic development was an
important aim. For example, residents in A4 were initially very clear
that local shopkeepers should not participate in the initiative, pushing
them out of the steering group, although this position softened over
time.
3.2.4. Constraining residents’ ability to work with other agencies
BL was implemented as the budgets of public and third sector
agencies were being significantly cut by the policy of austerity in-
troduced by central government after the 2008 financial crisis. In this
context, participants in all areas expressed some distrust of the motives
of external agencies. One BL Rep for example, reported concerns that
the million pounds was attracting some parties “who were blatantly
chasing the money” (A4-int-BLR). A Rep in another area expressed
these concerns in vivid language:
“One of the things with Big Local nationally … is that: ‘Oh a mil-
lion’. The predators move in. You know ‘us’ in public services who are
being cut to ribbons gosh we can have some of that. ‘Yeah we'll deliver
what you want but it'll cost you £30,000 rather than £3000’ (A10-int-
BLR).
Uniformly, participants expressed a desire to honour one of the
principles underpinning the BL initiative: that the money should not
replace local government funding responsibilities. As a BL worker
managing community consultation noted: “The responsibility for pro-
viding for young people and creating opportunities for them, fits
squarely with the local authority and with employers and other orga-
nisations” (A1-int-BLW). In some areas BL Partnerships sought to create
distance from potential collaborators in order to protect their ‘owner-
ship’ of the money. For example in A4 negative feelings about the local
governments' previous involvement in the area meant that initially at
least, there was almost no contact between the Partnership and the
local council.
There was evidence that appeared to justify such caution. In A8, BL
funds were used to support provision of a youth worker when re-
dundancies happened in local government posts, whilst in A6 the BL
Partnership was funding youth provision that had been cut. These
circumstances could lead to a complete breakdown of relationships. For
example, as reported in observational notes: the Partnership in A10 was
negotiating with the local council over a small disused green space. At
an informal meeting, they were presented with an invoice for the cost of
fencing the area that the residents had agreed to maintain in exchange
for the council ensuring it was safe for public use by fencing it. The
residents declined to pay the invoice. The project was shelved and the
residents were left feeling disappointed and duped and trust was lost.
3.3. Doing relational work: negotiating tensions and transforming
relationships
Tensions in relationships between groups of residents and with ex-
ternal organisations were evident in all 10 areas. However, as this re-
sident illustrates, there was also a widespread recognition of the need
for the relational work required in “establishing, maintaining, nego-
tiating, transforming ... interpersonal relations" (Zelizer, 2012:149).
“You've got to be cautious, and you've got to be accommodating. But
you sometimes don't want to be. But you have to work with people …
We have had councilors [elected officials] attend meetings … it's gen-
erally because they want to suggest where money could be used. And I
always feel defensive straightaway. But no, at the back of my heart I do
know that yes, work sensibly and use funding properly” (A2-int-RPM).
BL was seen by some to have the potential to mend fractured re-
lationships deeply entrenched over many years in shared public nar-
ratives of a place. In A8, a mining community with a history of social
cohesion and community activism, which had experienced high levels
of job loss in recent decades, a representative from the Locally Trusted
Organisation expressed the:
“dis-engagement from decision-making over the years … [residents
are] very sceptical that it (£1 million) will just get hived off. And that is
quite [strong] I think within an established community. The older es-
tablished communities are sort of very difficult to break …. Big Local's
an opportunity to change that …“(A8-int-BLW).
Likewise, in A4, there were suggestions that BL could right the
perceived wrongs of the past, by using the money to fund collaborative
work between residents and local agencies. In this and other areas the
tensions provoked by the money and the subsequent relational work
required to resolve them, were seen as an almost inevitable part of the
BL process. In A6, for example, a LGO reflected on potentially positive
impacts of the tense relational dynamics triggered by the money:
“I was a bit worried about the conflict it was creating. I didn't think
that was good for people's health and wellbeing. And people feeling
exasperated and walking out … I just worried about that from the
community engagement perspective and the council's perspective. …
But … maybe that's a process they needed to go through … Because …
it was very pioneering” (A6-int-LGO).
Some local organisations also understood the need for relational
work: to adopt different approaches to negotiate new relationships with
BL communities. In A6, for example, a youth charity worker described
how his organisation found ways to resist being seen as ‘chasing the
money’ when the award of one million pounds was announced and
recognised the shift towards greater community control that the million
offered:
“We backed off a little bit … I've … re-engaged with it [BL
Partnership] in the last six months … because … it was a bit like vul-
tures around a carcass … a million pound … eyes light up … So … we
have to fund our work but we don't want to be just like dipping into all
different places just to get the money … we want to do things that are
benefitting and empowering the community. Which is exactly what this
is about” (A6-int-O).
3.4. Relational work in BL Partnerships: delaying resident-led decisions and
action
BL Partnerships were the local governance spaces with final
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collective control of how the £1 million was spent. This decision-
making process required significant relational work amongst
Partnership members, a majority of whom were residents, as the money
was ‘earmarked’ for what was considered legitimate purposes.
Observational notes showed how, during meetings, all the Partnerships
expressed a strong commitment to accountability and responsibility: to
be seen to be ‘doing the right thing’ with the money. But ‘getting it
right’ meant different things to different Partnership members. These
conflicting perspectives were apparent in three areas in particular: the
governance of the money: the balance between immediate small spends
and longer-term larger investment; and the balance between direct and
indirect benefits to the community. As we discuss below, navigating the
complex terrain between divergent views in these three areas, involved
considerable relational work which could make collective decision-
making processes lengthy, with many areas struggling to meet their
initial spending timelines.
3.4.1. Getting the governance right
Participants from several areas described lengthy timeframes be-
tween announcement of the £1 million and seeing impacts of its in-
vestment, in their communities. Some areas established particularly
transparent, but time-consuming processes to demonstrate legitimate
decision-making (e.g. A4, A10). In A10 an audit group met regularly,
discussed funding applications from community members and reported
back to Partnership meetings. Then if no consensus was reached,
community members could be requested to submit an amended pro-
posal.
Less commonly, external governance procedures were perceived to
create unnecessary delays, as one resident noted:
“Every now and again … he (Rep) puts another obstacle in our way
… rules and regulations… Sometimes it feels like you've got this money
… like a big carrot … and they keep moving it higher … and you have
to … jump through that hoop … another hoop … He's like St Peter. And
the Big Local are like God …. Because he's like their representative …
we've been sitting on this money for the last two years … and nothing's
happened yet (A1-int-RPM).
A lack of tangible signs that the money was being spent to benefit
communities was a source of discontent amongst some residents,
prompting more relational work to manage expectations as this LGO
worker highlighted:
“It [BL] was sort of sold quite early on as: ‘Oh you've got the money
you can do what you like.’ Well obviously you can't, can you? And that
can sometimes be a false expectation for people, then I think, so you
have to manage that” (A10-int-LGO).
3.4.2. Getting the balance right: community benefits vis-a-vis spending
wisely for sustainability
In several BL Partnerships agreement on specific spending was hard
won, despite having broadly shared priority areas. Disagreements often
reflected schisms between Partnership members about spending ap-
proaches:
“I have a number of plans that are costed and ready to go and in my
view address the priorities that we identified with the consultation …
that approach hasn't gone down that well with some of the others …
who want to spend a bit longer talking about things rather than doing
anything … “(A3-int-RPM).
In A4 the steering group attempted to balance the need to be seen to
be spending the money ‘wisely’, and the expectations of residents
asking why the money was not being spent on tangible benefits. Hence
they decided to spend on a high profile project for a ‘quick gain’; the
painting of a mural on the side of the building where BL meetings took
place.
For most BL Partnerships working with external agencies (power
with) was the key to 'sustainable' spending: “We're not spending the
money as quickly as probably expected and it's because we're looking
for who else wants to work with us, who else wants to invest” (A10-int-
BLW). But the relational work required to build and maintain optimum
relationships with local agencies was time consuming. For example, one
ex-chair of a Partnership expressed ambivalence around working with
the local council to ensure long term gains but recognised the need to
do so and highlighted communication as key:
“A million pounds is not a lot of money stretched over 10 years but
if we know what the council's plans are or we can have an influence on
what plans the council put into place… then in terms of long term plans
we might be able to achieve a lot more. But at the same time also
keeping in mind that we don't want the council to think BL is going to
replace anything that they're going to withdraw. So, I think it's so im-
portant to have the communication” (A6-int-RPM).
A participant from the same area highlighted how maximising im-
pact was dependent on using the £1 million creatively on structures and
processes that supported sustainability:
“It's not a lot of money … it's got its own logic to it … you start
something and then it creates more and more and more activity.
Because a million pounds isn't a lot, so it's got to be about creating an
ethos and a structure that allows things to keep going …. ” (A6-int-
RLC).
3.4.3. Getting the balance right: direct and indirect benefits
There were mixed views about using some of the £1 million for day-
to-day running of BL as opposed to projects with direct benefits for the
community. Some areas hired professional expertise early, ensuring on-
going support for their work (e.g. A1, A7, A8, A9). In A1 Partnership
members saw specialist support as an investment and commissioned a
community development organisation to help them design and deliver
the initial community consultation; a youth work organisation to con-
sult with young people and paid for a local government officer one day
per week to co-ordinate BL activities. In contrast, A5 were reluctant to
finance anything not considered to be directly beneficial for the com-
munity, while in A10 resident members of the BL partnership vo-
lunteered to undertake everyday tasks and administrative duties as a
cost saving exercise. However, this created problems. As one resident
explained, she had left the Partnership because their reluctance to pay
for professional support had placed an unacceptable burden on volun-
teers.
Over time more areas recognised that ‘buying-in’ professional help
would extend administrative capacity, sustain day-to-day management
and reduce the volunteering burden on residents (e.g. A2, A6, A7, A8,
A10). But employing workers brought its own challenges. In A4, ob-
servations showed that the paid worker found it impossible to manage
conflicting priorities amongst steering group members and resigned. In
general, areas appeared to be more likely to pay for support if ex-
penditure was perceived as an investment and route to sustainability.
This was very clearly expressed as a priority in some areas. For ex-
ample, as observational data showed, in A10 money was used to hire
professionals (in the short term) to support resident volunteers to set up
a job club. The aim was, that the residents would gain experience and
skills, to equip them with the ability to run the job club themselves,
while also laying the groundwork to ensure the initiative lasted beyond
the 10 years of funding.
4. Discussion
There is a long-standing debate globally regarding the relative
merits of programmes that target resources at issues identified by fun-
ders (e.g. Brazil's Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer programme
(Shei et al., 2014) and those that give communities of interest and/or
place some measure of control over how funds are spent to address local
needs (e.g. the EU Community-led local development approach to fund
allocation, European Commission, 2018). A recent review of health
inequities in England (Marmot et.al. 2020:10) concludes that when
community approaches are empowering they can be "central to efforts
to reduce health inequalities” increasing collective control which has a
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“positive influence on health.” (2020:139). However, evidence on the
relative effectiveness of giving disadvantaged communities influence
over how funds are to be invested to improve their lives has been ar-
gued to be “incomplete and results are open to interpretation” (Van
Domelen, 2007, pii). More recently, Reynolds et al. (2015, p1) has
shown there is considerable diversity in the type and extent of influence
over resources communities are given in policy initiatives and there is
very little evidence on the precise role of control over money in path-
ways to positive benefits.
The findings reported here add to this limited evidence base illu-
minating how giving control over money to communities bearing the
brunt of social inequities can operate to support the development of the
capabilities – understood as different forms of power – they require to
exercise greater collective control over the social determinants of health
and hence act as a potential mechanism to reduce health inequities. Our
findings illustrate how the £1 million given to these 10 BL areas acted
as a catalyst in reshaping, rebalancing and extending relationships
amongst residents and between residents and local agencies.
As BL residents came together to identify common concerns and
interests and share knowledge and skills, they gained greater con-
fidence in their ability to act collectively so their ‘power within’ grew.
Controlling how the £1 million was to be spent also provided credibility
to resident-led BL Partnerships, enhancing their capability to develop
‘power with’ others so encouraging them to enter into, build on and
negotiate relationships with external agencies, sometimes shifting the
power balance. In all areas growing 'power within' and 'power with' was
associated with greater 'power to' act, as residents became more as-
sertive about taking control over how money was to be spent.
As Reynolds and colleagues note, however: "‘community’ cannot be
interpreted merely as a setting or recipient of such an intervention, but
something constructed and negotiated through the flow of money it-
self’" (Reynolds et al, 2015, p88). The social connections the money
drove amongst residents and with local agencies, and the positive im-
pacts these had on BL communities' ‘capabilities’ for collective control,
did not come easily. In all areas the £1million created tensions, which
were often significant, and BL residents had to engage in complex and
often time consuming relational work to overcome these. Like Cornish
and Ghosh (2007) revealed in their community led project, partici-
pating required work to change relationships between the community
and more powerful external agencies (p496). Our findings highlight
how: BL communities balanced caution with accommodation when
negotiating with cash strapped local councils; learnt to re-build trust in
previously fractured relationships and attempted to re-calibrate well-
established divisions of control and power. The role of trust in in-
itiatives has been emphasised by others (Cornwall, 2008), holding
symbolic value (Renedo and Marston, 2015) that influences the dy-
namics and outcomes of community participation.
This relational work involved residents “establishing, maintaining,
negotiating, transforming, and terminating interpersonal relations”
(Zelizer, 2012,p149), to ensure that the money operated effectively.
Resonating with Campbell and Cornish (2010), who recognised re-
lationship-building as key for community mobilisation, applying a re-
lational lens to our data, revealed how the precise nature of relational
work was shaped by diverse relational settings - the ‘pattern of re-
lationships among institutions, public narratives, and social practices'
(Somers, 1994,p626) – operating within and across these 10 areas. Key
properties of these settings included the peculiarities of local geo-
graphical boundaries, the diversity of cultural understandings about
legitimate uses for the money, negative public narratives about pre-
vious community initiatives and significant reductions in public ex-
penditure on local services resulting from central government's aus-
terity policies.
Our findings also reveal ambivalence in the relational work under-
taken. Residents saw opportunities to forge new relationships with
external agencies albeit recognising the risks. On the one hand, influ-
enced by dominant public narratives, they were wary of working with
agencies that were perceived to have ‘behaved badly’ in the past or
which they considered to be desperate for funding to continue to deliver
services. On the other hand residents recognised that working with
others would ultimately increase the impact and sustainability of the £1
million. Negotiating new ways of working together meant residents
risked being (or feeling) duped, and members of organisations risked
being seen as disingenuous ‘vultures’, attracted by the money. In this
context, both residents and the staff of local organisations needed to
negotiate to re-establish trust and (re) build viable and meaningful
relationships in particular settings. However, in some circumstances
resident-led Partnerships felt they had to protect the money from other
parties (e.g. councils with cuts to budgets). In these situations residents
exercised their ‘power to’ withdraw from negotiations - to shelve some
projects (e.g. A10 failed negotiations for the green space) - giving up
some opportunities to exercise ‘power with’ in the short term.
5. Study limitations
The findings draw on data generated (2014-2015 in a diversity
sample of 10 BL areas, in order to gain an understanding of the first
three years of this 10 + year initiative. Our qualitative approach al-
lowed a detailed investigation, across these areas, generating an ex-
tensive data-set that provided insights into the role of the money in
these early stages of the programme. Our analytical strategy was to
present the results across areas, while attending to any divergent
themes by making constant comparisons between areas. Though there
were some differences associated with local context, the relational dy-
namics identified were present in all ten areas. We cannot say, at this
stage, how ‘representative’ these areas are of all 150 BL neighbour-
hoods. In later phases of the study we have conducted indepth field-
work in an additional five areas and are looking explicitly for areas
which diverge from the general patterns described here. Additionally,
our research reports a snapshot early in a 10 year plus initiative. We are
currently tracing the role of the money over the longer term to in-
vestigate how the relational dynamcis identified evolve over time and
how the role of the money changes. As in all qualitative research, our
engagement with participants in the fieldwork sites and their knowl-
edge of our research may have influenced responses during interviews;
residents may have been sensitized to ‘progress’ relating to expenditure
timelines; other stakeholders may have prioritised the importance of
collaborating with residents. The extensive observational work provides
a measure of triangulation.
6. Conclusion
Community-led approaches to delivering social and/or health im-
provements are increasingly common in public health and in other
policy fields. Whilst few of these initiatives would give residents com-
plete control over a substantial sum of money, as does the BL pro-
gramme, many involve the transfer to community members of greater
collective influence over how resources or assets (financial and other-
wise) are used to improve the conditions in which they live. The find-
ings presented here have implications for the design of these initiatives
that will help maximise the positive impact (and reduce the risk of
negative impacts) of much more modest money/asset based community
initiatives.
Whilst we do not know whether the amount of money was sig-
nificant, our findings suggest that giving communities ‘complete’ col-
lective control of budgets – no matter the size-could still be impactful as
positive benefits derive from both the symbolic and the purchasing
value of money. They also point to the need for local initiatives to
understand and plan for the scale and nature of the relational work
involved in achieving positive benefits and how this may vary across
the relational setting in which such initiatives are to be implemented -
to the history of the area and previous area-based initiatives, to the
nature and quality of existing relationships amongst residents and with
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external agencies as well as to the impact on these relationships of the
wider political or policy agenda. Integrating these understandings into
the design of community-based initiatives will increase their potential
to improve population health and reduce health inequalities.
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